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The first and most striking feature to emerge from this collection of essays is that environmental 
law scholarship is perceived by environmental law scholars themselves a encompassing a wide 
range of methodologies, topics, disciplines and considerations. Environmental law scholarship 
caters for a wide range of different approaches to scholarship and the scholars considering the 
discipline their home represent a diverse range of backgrounds. Not only do they come from 
different jurisdictions, carrying with them understandings of scholarship anchored in their 
unique legal cultures but these scholars also come to rely on and make use of a diverse sets of 
methodologies and understandings of what scholarship is. Whilst methodological rigour is seen 
as important, there is not an exclusive commitment to a specific methodology.1 This ‘internal 
diversity’, to use Maldonado’s phrase, might even be seen as calling into question whether we 
are at all talking about one coherent discipline.2 In the least, it becomes clear that environmental 
law scholarship is highly contingent. Contingent in the sense that a given body of scholarship 
– and indeed each piece of scholarship – reflects a unique set of circumstances. These 
circumstances include, for example, the legal framework of environmental law and regulation 
                                                          
1 See also Cecot and Livermore infra ch 8. 
2 E.g. Maldonado infra ch 4, Lee and others infra ch 8 and Farber infra ch 10. 
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of the jurisdiction at hand and the institutional drivers and pressures as well as lived scholarly 
experiences of each individual scholar.3 In other words, the very understanding of what falls 
within the confines of environmental law will vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.  
 An added feature which underscores the permeable nature of the boundaries of 
environmental law scholarship as a discipline is the widespread understanding that 
environmental law scholarship is by its very nature interdisciplinary.4 Whether this is asserted 
as a descriptive observation by reference to the strong links between environmental law and 
other disciplines in the social or natural sciences or whether it is put forward as a prescriptive 
claim, arguing that environmental law scholarship ought to learn from other disciplines, the 
interdisciplinary nature of environmental law scholarship is uncontroversial. That of course is 
not to say that engaging in interdisciplinary work is easy – the account put forward by Lee et 
al in chapter 8 evidently shows that interdisciplinary scholarship poses challenges for those 
scholars brave enough to expressly pursue scholarship through an interdisciplinary project. But 
it also highlights the centrality and importance of the environmental law scholar’s ability to 
rely on considerations and frameworks ordinarily thought to be external to legal scholarship.  
One important implication, however, emerges from this. If interdisciplinarity is so 
important to environmental law and environmental law scholarship, if it becomes a central or 
defining characteristic of the discipline, it arguably ceases to be interdisciplinarity as ordinarily 
understood.5 That is, interdisciplinary scholarship becomes a disciplinary feature of 
environmental law scholarship – it is what environmental law scholars do (or at least a large 
                                                          
3 E,g, Fisher infra ch 3 and Guneratne infra ch 11. On personal experiences see e.g. Angela Mae Kupenda, 
‘Personal Essay – On the Receiving End of Influence: Helping Craft the Scholarship of my Students and how 
their Work Influences Me’ on https://jotwell.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/Kupenda-Personal-essay-on-
influence.pdf (accessed April 20 2018). 
4 E.g. Chris Hilson, ‘Editor’s Foreword’ (2008) 20 JEL 1 and Margherita infra ch 6. In making this argument, I 
take interdisciplinarity to include what is by some termed multi-disciplinary and trans-disciplinary scholarship. 
See Jerry A Jacobs, In Defense of Disciplines (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013).  




share of us do) – so much so that environmental law scholarship becomes synonymous with 
scholarly engagement with other disciplines. If this is the case, the strong reliance on external 
disciplines ultimately results in these disciplines being internalised into the discipline of 
environmental law.6 Interdisciplinarity consequently becomes the disciplinary characteristics 
of environmental law scholarship.   
On this reading, the broad focus of environmental law scholarship and its 
interdisciplinary nature results in environmental law scholarship reflecting its object of study - 
environmental law. Environmental law itself is often seen as defying traditional legal 
boundaries between the public and the private as well as between the international, the federal 
and the local.7 Though this poses challenges for environmental law scholars when it comes to 
the ability to engage with and criss-cross jurisdictional boundaries which remain more firm in 
other disciplines of law and legal scholarship, purely as a matter of observation, a central 
characteristic of environmental law scholarship is the fact that those engaging in it must 
maintain a level of scholarly flexibility. Again, given that scholars from time to time have 
called into question whether environmental law itself constitutes an orderly discipline, scholars 
would be forgiven for pondering whether it is at all possible to conceptualise environmental 
law scholarship as a coherent whole.8  
In response to the broad disciplinary confines and the contingency of its scholarship, 
the most constructive way to conceptualise environmental law scholarship is be as a practice 
embedded within a broader legal culture. The practice being environmental law scholarship 
and the culture being environmental law as a body of law. In defining environmental law 
scholarship and its antecedent object of study as a practice and a culture respectively, the point 
                                                          
6 Louis Menand, The Marketplace of Ideas (New York: Norton & Company, 2010)119. 
7 E.g. Elisabeth Fisher, Environmental Law: A Very Short Introduction (OUP 2017). 
8 E.g. Zygmunt Plater, ‘Environmental Law and Three Economies: Navigating a Sprawling Field of Study, 
Practice, and Societal Governance in which Everything is Connected to Everything Else’ (1999) 23 Harv. Envtl. 
L. Rev. 359.  
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is not so much to prescribe a particular form of methodology for the discipline.9 The point is 
simply – in a descriptive sense – to try and capture what it is environmental law is and what it 
is environmental law scholars do. The concept of legal culture is ordinarily used as a term to 
explain the differences between legal systems. Such differences are evidently important from 
the perspective of a comparative scholar who needs to be alert to the finer cultural differences 
between superficially similar rules and concepts found in different jurisdictions.10 Conversely, 
the application of the term legal cultures here is applied on the level of a specific legal subject 
and discipline – that of environmental law. On this reading, a legal culture captures the values, 
ideas, habits and practices embodied in a given subject.11 Environmental law defined as a 
culture is thus a domain ‘with a distinctive history, terminology and personnel’12 which is 
different from the history and terminology of, say, corporate law, constitutional law and 
contract law (though there might be overlaps).13 Each legal culture (or sub-culture) thus 
contains and exhibits ‘a repertoires of actions, practices and beliefs that are relatively flexible 
and open to change’,14 giving force to ‘ideas, values, attitudes, and opinions’.15  
Conceptualising legal domains as cultures in this way, explains the differences between 
legal subject areas when it comes to issues such as what constitutes sources of law and doctrines 
in each field of law and when it comes to the question of what constitutes valid reasons in the 
debates taking place within a subject area. For example, the answer to the question of what 
constitutes a valid source of law will vary from, say, contract law to environmental law though 
                                                          
9 See for this e.g. Paul W Kahn, The Cultural Study of Law (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009). 
10 Eloise Scotford, Environmental Principles and the Evolution of Environmental Law (Oxford: Bloomsbury, 
2017).  
11 David Nelken. ‘Thinking about Legal Culture’ (2014) Asian Journal of Law and Society 255-274.  
12 Sally Engle Merry, ‘What is Legal Culture? An Anthropological Perspective’ (2010) 5 J. Comp. L. 40, 47. 
13 Similarly, defining environmental law as a culture and its scholarship community as a practice by way of 
reliance on ideas and concepts derived from scholars engaged in cultural studies of law does not necessarily mean 
that the attempt to do so is interdisciplinary. It simply means that, as a matter of description, that this is what 
environmental law and environmental law scholarship looks like. 
14 Merry ‘What is Legal Culture?’, 42. 
15 Lawrence M Friedman, ‘Is there a Modern Legal Culture?’ (1994) 7 Ratio Juris 117, 118. 
5 
 
there are likely to be some similarity. Environmental lawyers will likely hesitate little in 
invoking so-called environmental principles when discussing points of law (on the assumption 
that these principles are legally relevant) whereas lawyers in other areas of law might well 
hesitate invoking what they see as policy considerations.16 The point is that each subculture of 
law stands apart from other subcultures by reference to its constituent parts.  
Though the attempt to conceptualise law as a cultural with several subcultures is not 
necessarily new nor entirely problem-free, the main advantage from our perspective is that it 
provides a platform on which to explore the role of scholarship. Again, the point is that each 
legal culture will be host to not only different sources of law, values and doctrines but that 
these differences will give rise to and find expression in different practices, including a 
scholarly practice. Each practice (including a scholarly practice) will thus operate within and 
be shaped by the contours, histories and values of each culture. In addition to scholarly 
practices, wider legal practices within the culture of environmental law may include practices 
of adjudication (in which the main participants are judges and legal practitioners) and practices 
of legislative drafting and amendment (in which the main participants are legislators and 
administrative agencies). In each subculture of law, the constituent parts of each practice will 
vary slightly from subculture to subculture. The practice of environmental law before the courts 
(see Aagaard infra) will consequently vary from the practice of, say, human rights litigation 
not only in terms of the participants (e.g. differences in the types of adjudicators as well as 
adjudicatory institutions) but also when it comes to the ways in which the practice is practically 
conducted in terms of what arguments can be advanced and methods of litigation. Similarly, 
the practice of legislative drafting of environmental law texts will vary from the drafting of 
                                                          
16 In saying this, the point alluded to above about the need to appreciate the finer differences in legal cultures 
between different jurisdiction remains highly relevant, considering the fact that the legal nature and thereby 
relevance of so-called environmental principles will vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, e.g. Scotford 
Environmental Principles.  
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commercial codes and legal texts as a result of the nature of the values, habits and beliefs within 
each practice. But what does it mean specifically to define environmental law scholarship as a 
practice? 
A practice is necessarily an inherently social enterprise.17 That is, the defining feature 
and genesis of a practice is the community of participants which sets out the ‘agreed criteria of 
what are reasonable or unreasonable readings’.18 On this reading, a practice facilitates what 
Fish calls a ‘bounded-argument space’ in which ‘the arguments that can be made and the 
arguments that just won’t fly are formally identified and known to everyone working in the 
field.’19 Environmental law scholarship is thus ‘an institutionalised social practice’, and 
scholarship is validated by reference to its contribution to the practice and the value which the 
participants put on a given work of scholarship.20 On this reading, disciplines defined as a 
practice stand apart from those disciplines (such as e.g. the natural and medical sciences) which 
are primarily defined by reference to their adherence to a priori established methodology. As 
seen in this collection of essays, a central feature of environmental law scholarship is its refusal 
to commit to a particular methodology. A practice is consequently a deliberative practice in so 
far as a central feature of it is, very basically, the writing, publishing and communication of 
scholarly outputs seeking to engage considerations of what the law is, what it ought to be and 
how it ought to work.21 This self-regulating and self-referential nature of a scholarly practice 
                                                          
17 Hans-George Gadamer, Reason in the Age of Science (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1996). See also Ian 
Ward, ‘Literature and the Legal Imagination’ (1998) 49 N. Ir. Legal Q. 167 and Fisher infra ch 3. 
18 Christopher McCrudden, ‘Legal Research and Social Sciences’ (2006) LQR 632, 634. Naturally, this boundary-
setting by a practice’s participants is not formalised through the creation of formal criteria but through the 
scholarly activities such as peer-review, mentoring, citations and the organisation of conferences. 
19 Stanley Fish, Winning Arguments: What Works and Doesn’t Work in Politics, The Bedroom, The Courtroom 
and the Classroom (New York: Harper Collins, 2016) 72. 
20 Pierre Schlag, ‘Spam Jurisprudence, Air Law, and the Rank Anxiety of Nothing Happening (A Report on the 
State of the Art)’ (2009) 97 Geo. L. J. 803, 805. See also Edward L Rubin, ‘The Evaluation of Prescriptive 
Scholarship’ (1990) 10 Tel Aviv U. Stud. L. 101. 
21 Pierre Schlag, Laying Down the Law (New York: New York University Press, 1996) 4. 
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means that the practice itself defines ‘whatever it is one has to know or believe in order to 
operate in a manner acceptable to its members’.22.  
A scholarly practice, moreover, serves the important purposes of providing a minimum 
level of stability in a given field of study.23 In securing a level of stability, a practice is also an 
inherently practical endeavour.24 Practical in the sense that the scholars participating in the 
practice will constantly make decisions and choices shaping the confines of the practice.25 Such 
decision-making include, for example, decisions made in the context of a scholar’s independent 
research as to what questions to engage with and how to answer these (i.e. questions of 
methodology) as well as decisions made in the context of other scholars’ work in the process 
of commenting on and reviewing this scholarship. When making such decisions, scholars 
consequently execute individual plans and choices though this is done from within the confines 
of the communal practice simultaneously co-determining the collective concerns and priorities 
of the practice. To Gadamer, practice is consequently ‘conducting oneself and acting in 
solidarity.’26 
Central to the practice of scholarship is thus the commitment of those taking part in a 
practice to a common and mutually agreed set of understandings and ground rules (though 
often these rules remain unspoken). The practice is consequently a reflection of a perspective 
embedded within the practice. Importantly, however, the argument that scholarship is 
conducted from an internal perspective of a practice is not to be taken to mean that that the 
practice only engages in traditional doctrinal scholarship, excluding perspectives on the law 
                                                          
22 Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures (Fontana Press, 1973), 11. See also Menand The Marketplace 
of Ideas. 
23 Gadamer Reason in the Age of Science, 76 and Geertz The Interpretation of Cultures, 18. 
24 This is of course not to imply that a practice cannot engage with questions of theory. 
25 See also Thomas Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (2nd ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1970). 
26 Gadamer Reason in the Age of Science, 87. See also Richard J Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1983).  
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and materials which are traditionally seen as external to the law.27  As noted above, central to 
the practice of environmental law scholarship is the commitment to methods and considerations 
which may well be considered external in other practices and areas of legal scholarship. On 
this account, the practice of environmental law scholarship is very likely to be markedly 
different from practices in other areas of legal scholarship because the practice of 
environmental law scholarship maintains a commitment to external perspectives.28  
If indeed the practice of scholarship is a social practice, it necessarily follows that the 
practice is not static. Instead it develops over time with the scholarly focus and inclinations of 
its participants. As Czarnezki and Schindler note the boundaries of the discipline and its 
scholarship will continue to expand.29 Though commentators debate whether the ability of a 
scholarly practice to change and realign itself over time is desirable, the point made here is not 
so much a prescriptive assessment as it is a reflection of what has actually taken place in 
environmental law scholarship over the years.  Freyfogle, for example, argues that ‘when it 
began in earnest, environmental law scholarship was a value-drive enterprise….[this] 
characteristic has become less evident, with an increasing number of scholars in the field 
displaying little passion about environmental law ills.’30 Though Freyfogle’s observation is no 
doubt right, the question of whether the change in focus is something to begrudge is open to 
debate.  To some, the idea that environmental law scholarship is necessarily wedded to 
pursuing a specific outcome goes against the very definition of scholarship.31 Similarly, in 
response to those decrying the lack of conformity within the practice, it might even be argued 
that a ‘function of scholarship is to afflict the intellectually comfortable’, disturbing the 
                                                          
27 McCrudden ‘Legal Research and Social Sciences’, 633-634.  
28 McCrudden does, however, suggest that this feature is one which is found in legal research more generally, ibid 
642. 
29 Czarnezki and Schindler infra ch 12. 
30 Eric T Freyfogle, ‘Five Paths of Environmental Scholarship’ (2000) U. Ill. L. Rev. 115, 128. 
31 Elizabeth Fisher and others ‘Maturity and Methodology: Starting a Debate about Environmental Law 
Scholarship’ (2009) 21 JEL 213 and David Feldman ‘The Nature of Legal Scholarship’ (1989) 52 MLR 498. 
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scholarly tranquillity of those who desire a common outlook from within a practice.32 This 
point is particularly important considering that one of the risks which emerge from the self-
referential nature of conceptualising environmental law scholarship as a social practice is that 
it might result in conformist scholarship.33 In response to this risk, any social enterprise, 
including practices of scholarship, might ‘learn to value both having opinions and keeping an 
open mind, to mix the delights of winning an argument with the pleasures of being good 
listeners.’34 Again, this highlights the argument central to a practice of scholarship is the 
collegial commitment of its participants to a common goal: the preservation and evolution of 
the practice.  
More generally, the potential for the focus of a practice to diverge suggests two things.35 
First, either the practice of environmental law scholarship is so broad that it can accommodate 
divergent perspectives relating to its core purposes within itself or, second, several sub-
practices emerge and form within the wider practice. The reality is likely to be a combination 
of both of these points. Notwithstanding the accommodating nature and diversity found in 
environmental law scholarship, the sheer depth and size of the practice suggests that within the 
broad confines of the practice, several smaller practices are found. Some of the sub-practices 
could for instance include scholarship engaging primarily with climate change law, 
environmental law and economics, environmental rights and environmental taxation (to 
mention just a few). Each of these sub-practices emerge as their own institutionalised social 
order with each of their own agreed criteria and understandings of what constitutes reasonable 
readings and vocabularies in the execution of the scholarship. This diversification does, 
however, take place within the confines of the broader practice that is environmental law 
                                                          
32 McCrudden ‘Legal Research and Social Sciences’, 640. 
33 E.g. David Bryden, ‘Scholarship about Scholarship’ (1992) 63 U. Colo. L. Rev. 641.  
34 Albert O Hirschman, ‘Having Opinions – One of the Elements of Well-Being?’ (1989) 79 The American 
Economic Review 75, 78. 
35 Andreas Philppopoulos-Mihalopoulos and Victoria Brooks (eds), Research Methods in Environmental Law 
(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2017).  
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scholarship. The ‘environmental’ in environmental taxation and the ‘environmental’ in 
environmental rights is what set these subjects and practices apart from tax scholarship and 
human rights scholarship more generally.  
From this it may well be argued that the practice of environmental law scholarship is 
more porous and less firm than other practices of legal scholarship.36 The permeable nature of 
the practice may indeed explain why environmental law scholarship is perceived as immature 
by some commentators.37 On this reading, immaturity is not the diagnosis but the symptom of 
the youth of the subject (relatively speaking) as well as the open-ended and multi-layered 
nature of the culture of environmental law and the  practice of environmental law scholarship 
itself. To the extent it is at all desirable, the ability to firm up and solidify the confines of the 
practice is likely to only emerge with time. Charges of immaturity may therefore not be as 
unsettling as they are likely to be perceived by some participants in the practice of 
environmental law scholarship. In fact, imposing and contemplating anxiety over one’s practice 
is one way to advance the practice and ultimately to pursue excellence.38 Ironically, the 
willingness to reflect on and engage with concerns of immaturity, as attempted in this 
collection, in itself shows a presence of maturity. 
To the extent an ‘ideal environmental law scholar’ (to use Austin’s phrase) emerges 
from this, it seems that this scholar ought at least to maintain a commitment to the social 
practice that she is part of.39 This commitment ought to, as a minimum, entail the reciprocal 
willingness to engage in a reflective manner with the scholarship being conducted within the 
practice with the view to maintaining the practice itself.40 This means not only that the 
                                                          
36 See also Fish Winning Arguments, 170, arguing, ‘not all bounded spaces are the same; in some the boundaries 
are not as rigorously polices as they are in others.’ 
37 Fisher et al ‘Maturity and Methodology’.  
38 Edward L Rubin, ‘The Evaluation of Prescriptive Scholarship’ (1990) 10 Tel Aviv U. Stud. L. 101, 111-112. 
39 Arthur Austin. ‘The Postmodern Infiltration of Legal Scholarship’ (2000) 98 Mich. Law. Rev. 1504. 
40 See also Paul W Kahn, ‘Freedom and Method’ (2017) in Geert van Gestel et al (eds), Rethinking Legal 
Scholarship: A Transatlantic Dialogue (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016) 499-524. 
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environmental law scholar ought to be prepared to engage meaningfully and rigorously with 
the work of other scholars in the practice but also that the scholar necessarily must tolerate a 
certain degree of scrutiny of her own work. Bruising as this can be, it is the price of admission 
to the practice of environmental law scholarship. This commitment to continuous engagement 
and reflection also means that the scholar is forced to constantly evaluate her own work against 
a benchmark which ideally does not stand still. If the participants in the scholarly practice 
continue to produce new scholarship and thereby re-configure the boundaries and agreements 
holding the practice together, the practice will as a result be a vibrant community. This vibrancy 
will in turn secure a less stale scholarly debate.   
But the commitment to the practice also entails an obligation to the principle of 
contingency. A commitment to contingency of the scholarly endeavour and the law itself in the 
sense that the very nature of scholarship – as well as environmental law – will vary from scholar 
to scholar from jurisdiction to jurisdiction and from one political environment to another.41 
Whilst this variation contributes to vibrancy, it also makes it very difficult for scholars to 
identify and develop universal foundations for the discipline of environmental law which will 
be applicable across jurisdictional boundaries.42 Consequently, when trying to do so, the 
environmental law scholar must keep in mind the principle of contingency and accept the 
inherently local nature of her endeavour.43 With the commitment to contingency also comes an 
acceptance of the likelihood that the scholarly endeavour is likely to be ‘messy’ (much like 
environmental law itself).44 The culture of environmental law thus exemplifies and embodies 
what Rubin has called ‘the transformation of the law’. A transformation which Czarnezski and 
                                                          
41 E.g. Guneratne infra ch 11, Czarnezki and Schindler infra ch 12 and Krämer infra ch 13. 
42 Scotford Environmental Principles and Ole W Pedersen, ‘The Contingent Foundations of Environmental Law’ 
(2018) JEL forthcoming.   
43 On this reading, environmental law scholarship does not necessarily constitute a lingua franca as suggested 
by Neil Duxbury ‘A Century of Legal Scholarship’ in Peter Cane and Mark Tushnet (eds) The Oxford 
Handbook of Legal Studies (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) 950-974. 
44 Carol M Rose, ‘Environmental Law Grows up (More or Less), and What Science can do to Help’ (2005) 9 
Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 273. 
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Schindler explicate in chapter 12.45 This transformation has taken place over decades in 
response to the changing role and function of the state and its regulatory character in modern 
societies. As noted above, environmental law, in most jurisdictions, consists not just of 
traditional primarily law provisions enacted by legislative assemblies and enforced by impartial 
judiciaries but of policies, principles, rules, decrees and regulations, interpreted and enforced 
by administrative agencies and applied to a wide range of legal subjects. In this legislative 
diversity of law and rules, ideals of legal coherence and methodological unity are unproductive 
if not unsuitable if we as scholars aim to understand the law.46  This ‘messiness’ need not, 
however, be perceived as something negative as long as the scholarship is conducted with 
rigour, diligence and commitment to the social practice of environmental law scholarship. 
An additional theme to emerge from this collection is that there is a real potential (as 
well as desire) for environmental law scholars to shape societal debates and to impact on 
decisions made beyond the academy.47 Indeed, as discussed by Pieraccini, in the UK, the ability 
to influence matters beyond the academy is increasingly required by higher education 
institutions. Against this, it is worth making the point that the quality nor the scholarly 
relevance of scholarship ought not to be conflated with its ability to reach out to policy-makers, 
law-makers or judiciaries. As Flexner reminds us: the ‘great discoveries which had ultimately 
proved to be beneficial to mankind had been made by men and women who were driven not 
by the desire to be useful but merely by the desire to satisfy their curiosity.’48 Of course 
Flexner’s point is made not in the context of legal scholarship (he does in fact concede that the 
motive of usefulness is dominant in legal research by virtue of its historical link to the legal 
profession) but in the context of scientific work more generally. Nevertheless, the argument 
                                                          
45 Edward L Rubin, ‘From Coherence to Effectiveness’ in Geert van Gestel et al (eds), Rethinking Legal 
Scholarship: A Transatlantic Dialogue (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2016) 310-350. 
46 Rubin notes that it might well be worthwhile ‘simply to acknowledge that law means something different in the 
administrative state than it did before.’ ibid, 328. 
47 E.g. Cecot and Livermore infra ch 7, Guneratne infra ch 11 and Krämer infra ch 13. 
48 Abraham Flexner, ‘The Usefulness of Useless Knowledge’ (1939) 179 Harpers 544, 545. 
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that the rigorous dedication to a given piece of scholarship – obsessive dedication to use 
Fisher’s phrase – implies value of that scholarship irrespective of whether it has any wider 
utility. 
As exemplified by this collection, the practice of environmental law scholarship is 
home to a wide variety of scholarly ways of doing scholarship. This is inevitable. As recently 
observed by Fisher: ‘understanding the legal substance of environmental law requires 
understanding of the place of law and the environment in the world.’49 Similarly, understanding 
environmental law scholarship requires an understanding of the place of scholarship and the 
role it plays in environmental law more widely. Whether scholarship is seen as being a purpose-
driven exercise aimed at reforming the law or whether it is seen as something entirely self-
contained, this chapter has argued that the most fruitful way to conceptualise environmental 
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